Rational Ignorance versus Rational Informedness : Perspectives of the Theory of Rational Ignorance

Abstract

Typical citizens fall into the state of rational ignorance as they have no incentive to study the nature of public goods, public affairs or public policies in detail. This paper contrasts ‘rational ignorance’ with ‘rational informedness’ from the perspective of the theory of rational ignorance, and identifies its negative effects. To this end, we explain the “phenomenon” of rational ignorance by two approaches, and then examine its major negative impacts. Then, based on the analysis, we propose incentives for typical citizens or voters to be rationally informed. First, we explain the phenomenon of rational ignorance in terms of the distribution of the benefits and costs of public programs, imperfect information, incentives for voters to be rationally ignorant, and political success. Second, we examine the theory of rational ignorance based on both the vote value and the logic of collective action. Finally, we identify the negative effects of rational ignorance in terms of the democratic paradox, ideology, and interest predation. Rational ignorance of typical citizens not only leads to the inequality in benefits distribution, which is the paradox of democracy, but also allows a small number of people to rob many citizens of their interests. In addition, typical citizens tend to rely on the ‘ideology’ that they have adopted when they make decision on public affairs, rather than trying to become rationally informed of them. Thus, the analysis of the present paper suggests that, for democracy to function properly, typical citizens and voters should make due efforts to be rationally informed.