Adam Smith and Bruce Yandle: Bootleggers and Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics

Abstract

Adam Smith and Bruce Yandle’s book, Bootleggers and Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics, provides a great introduction to some of the fundamental principles of public choice theory (chapters 1–3), as well as interesting applications of that theory to current regulatory topics (chapters 4–7). In addition, the book provides inspiration and food for thought for researchers in public choice and regulatory studies. As a result, the book will serve as excellent supplemental reading for introductory public choice courses, as well as required reading for scholars in the discipline. In chapter one, the authors review and expand on the original bootlegger and Baptist theory. They suggest that there are four potential, empirically observable, bootlegger and Baptist dynamics. First, in the absence of actual Baptist support, bootleggers can covertly advance their own objectives by using Baptist rhetoric. Second, bootleggers and Baptists sometimes pursue similar objectives independently of each other using distinct methods and strategies in doing so. Third, private firms may pursue their public interests by directly funding the activities of public advocacy groups in a cooperative manner. And finally, politicians may coordinate the activities of different groups of bootleggers and Baptists in a concerted effort to promote specific policy goals. Chapter two, ‘‘Bootleggers, Politicians, and Pork,’’ ties the bootlegger and Baptist theory into the larger public choice literature, connecting it to some of the most important contributions in that tradition—e.g., behavioral symmetry, rational ignorance, concentrated benefits and dispersed costs, the logic of collective action, rent seeking, the transitional gains trap, as well as different theories of regulation. In this chapter the authors make the very interesting point that there are high up-front costs of lobbying that, once incurred, make additional rent-seeking activities relatively cheap. This argument has often been cited casually as a potential explanation for the Tullock paradox, i.e. the observation that