Abstract
This essay argues that Charles W. Mills's The Racial Contract can enrich our understanding of the relationship between white supremacy and the foundations of the American polity. It begins with the text's central thesis before making three claims. First, I argue that Mills's work can deepen our thinking about the place of de jure white supremacy in American political history. His concept of a “racial contract” brings to the fore the consensual basis of slavery and Jim Crow. Second, I argue that Mills should be considered, along with Judith N. Shklar and Rogers M. Smith, as among the very few who identify racial oppression as a constitutive feature of the American polity and its civic culture. Third, I suggest why social contract theory, even Mills's revisionist application, may not advance Mills's normative goals.
Published Version
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