Quantum-secured time transfer between precise timing facilities: a field trial with simulated satellite links

Abstract

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs), such as GPS and Galileo, provide precise time and space coordinates globally and constitute part of the critical infrastructure of modern society. To reliably operate GNSS, a highly accurate and stable system time is required, such as the one provided by several independent clocks hosted in Precise Timing Facilities (PTFs) around the world. The relative clock offset between PTFs is periodically measured to have a fallback system to synchronize the GNSS satellite clocks. The security and integrity of the communication between PTFs is of paramount importance: if compromised, it could lead to disruptions to the GNSS service. Therefore, securing the communication between PTFs is a compelling use-case for protection via Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), since this technology provides information-theoretic security. We have performed a field trial demonstration of such a use-case by sharing encrypted time synchronization information between two PTFs, one located in Oberpfaffenhofen (Germany) and one in Matera (Italy)—more than 900 km apart. To bridge this large distance, a satellite-QKD system is required, plus a “last-mile” terrestrial link to connect the optical ground station (OGS) to the actual location of the PTF. In our demonstration, we have deployed two full QKD systems to protect the last-mile connection at both locations and have shown via simulation that upcoming QKD satellites will be able to distribute keys between Oberpfaffenhofen and Matera, exploiting already existing OGSs.