Abstract
Following Schumacher and Westmoreland, we address the problem of the capacity of a quantum wiretap channel. We first argue that, in the definition of the so-called "quantum privacy," Holevo quantities should be used instead of classical mutual informations. The argument actually shows that the security condition in the definition of a code should limit the wiretapper's Holevo quantity. Then we show that this modified quantum privacy is the optimum achievable rate of secure transmission.
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