Abstract

Based on the theoretical distinction between specific and diffuse support, this study examines and compares the effects of governance quality on political support in China, Japan, and South Korea. As regime type is an important contextual factor, the three countries provide ideal cases for testing how the effects of governance on political support vary across different political systems in East Asia. The results show that both economic and political governance affects specific support in the three countries. Political governance is more important for specific support in Japan and South Korea than in China, though regime type does not moderate the effect of political governance on diffuse support. In addition, economic governance is more important for diffuse support in China than in Japan and South Korea. In the field of specific support, economic governance is more important for support for government officials in Japan and South Korea than in China. Points for practitioners Public support is critical to a political system’s effectiveness, stability, and even survival. Quality of governance determines the fate of authoritarian regimes. It is because of bad governance that the masses cannot continue to tolerate the authorities and take actions to overthrow authoritarian leadership. Echoing Fukuyama’s (2013) argument that an authoritarian regime can be well governed, the Chinese government attempts to improve the quality of governance so as to sustain autocratic leadership by promoting technical innovation in administrative management. However, the intrinsic defects in authoritarian systems, such as the absence of constitutional constraints on power, undermine their capacity to improve political governance. It is questionable how much good political governance in an authoritarian system can achieve without democratic reform of the political system.

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