Abstract
Tool use can be considered in terms of purposeful behaviour. This emphasis on ‘purpose’ hides a host of assumptions about the nature of cognition and its relationship with physical activity. In particular, a notion of ‘purpose’ might assume that this is teleological which, in turn, requires a model of a desired end state of an action that can be projected onto the environment. Such a model is fundamental to traditional descriptions of cognition and a version of this can be found in the ‘template’ theory of stone-tool production (i.e. where the maker of the tool has a model in mind and attempts to reproduce this model in stone). Against this cognitive perspective, a number of approaches have been proposed that share their roots in the work of Gibson (i.e. ecological psychology) or Bernstein (i.e. dynamic systems). From these perspectives, ‘purpose’ is not a matter of a projection but opportunity; put simply, an action is performed until it need not be performed further. Trivial though this might sound, it has implications for how we define purpose and how this might apply to our understanding of tool use. We argue from a dynamic systems perspective and demonstrate the use of tools to crack bones for marrow extraction.
Highlights
Tool use can be considered in terms of purposeful behaviour
The properties of tools for butchery can be considered in terms of their morphology, size, sharpness (Key & Lycett, 2019), the anatomy and strength of the tool user (Marzke & Shackley, 1986), the type of grip that the user can apply to the tool (Silva-Gago et al, 2019) and the posture that is adopted when using the tool (McGorry et al, 2004)
We note that the more aesthetically pleasing ‘well-knapped’ tool was ideal for butchery but useless for marrow extraction
Summary
Tool use can be considered in terms of purposeful behaviour. This emphasis on ‘purpose’ hides a host of assumptions about the nature of cognition and its relationship with physical activity. A notion of ‘purpose’ might assume that this is teleological which, in turn, requires a model of a desired end state of an action that can be projected onto the environment Such a model is fundamental to traditional descriptions of cognition and a version of this can be found in the ‘template’ theory of stone-tool production (i.e. where the maker of the tool has a model in mind and attempts to reproduce this model in stone). Organista et al (2019) report a survey of the Bell’s Korongo 3b site at Olduvai Gorge (dating from 1.35 Ma) They found evidence of cut marks on 29% of bone samples suggesting butchery and stripping of carcasses. One might expect the hammerstone, handaxe or cleaver that is used for bone cracking to differ from tools used for these other forms of butchery
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