Abstract
What sort of “reason” or “reasons” figure in the concept of “Public Reason”? While the scholarly discussion about “Public Reason” has focused mainly on questions related to the “Public” aspect of it, this paper addresses the noun in the concept “Public Reason”. It locates Public Reason in the conceptual landscape informed by various theories of reasons for action developed by Bernard Williams, Gilbert Harman, Joseph Raz, Thomas Nagel and John Rawls among others. It enquires into the lessons that a plausible conception of Public Reason can draw from a theory of “internal” reasons, exclusionary reasons, neutral reasons, reasons for action in public life – as opposed to reasons for private life – and reasons advanced in a general discussion as contrasted to reasons figuring in the advocacy for a new law.
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