The Parameters of Public Reason

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter aims to recalibrate the philosophical concept of public reason in a way which renders it suitable to the evaluation of the legitimacy of law. It first compares the concept of public reason with Joseph Raz’s concept of exclusionary reasons, and finds strong resonance between second-order exclusionary reasons and public reason. It then places public reason in the context of a discussion sparked by Bernard Williams’ distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reasons, and finds the concept ‘internal’ reasons helpful for understanding public reason. When discussing the ‘publicness’ of public reason, two ideas are useful: that of the ‘input model of democracy’, and that of the ‘state’s neutrality’ towards competing conceptions of the good. In an attempt to recalibrate John Rawls’s conception of public reason so that it is rendered convincing in a constitutional context, the concept must be freed from two implausible limitations on its range urged by Rawls: that of its scope of application (which Rawls wanted to limit to ‘constitutional essentials’) and that of its agents (with the privileged position of judges in ascertaining public reasons). Finally, the chapter compares public reason with a concept which may be seen to be contiguous with it: that of reason of state. It is shown that, in some versions, (a ‘thin’ meaning) reason of state is functionally equivalent to public reason but that it also has problematic features related to its heavy reliance on the institutions of state.