Public Choice Theory for Political Sociology

Abstract

Some sociologists and other social scientists argue that political andother sociology should be founded on a venerabl e or nascen t rationa l choicetheory seen as a unifying paradigm. Such a paradigm is predicated uponthe assumption tha t individual s are rational actor s seekin g predefined goals.The latter are subsumed under material interest, utility, profit, or wealth,with other ends being implicitly viewed as nonrational and thus inconse-quential. The paradigm of rational choice is expected to bring theoreticalunity in social science, by being the basis of economics as well as of publicchoice theory in political science and social exchange theory in sociologyor social psychology. On this account, some sociologists attribute to anddemand for rational choice theory a "paradigmatic privilege" (Abell, 1992;Goldthorpe, 1998; Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997 ) withi n sociology, includin gpolitical sociology. Rational choice theory is attributed such a status onthe grounds that explanation of social processes and structures, includingpolitical ones, is reached only when these are accounted for in terms ofthe rational economic actions of individuals. Although political processesare not admittedly merely extensions of economic ones, the conception ofeconomically rational action is treated as a fruitful basis for social theory(Coleman, 1986:1-2).On the other hand, many sociologists have been concerned about theimpact on political sociology of such applications of the rational choice/economic approach to politica l phenomena , and more generally o f sociolog-ically limited frameworks for analyzing thes e phenomena. Moreover, someof them suggest that "we need to examine the degree to which this is afactor in the loss of political sociology [to political scientists and rationalchoice economists] which our discipline created and once dominated"(Light, 1992:909). Hence, the following question arises: Is a rational choice