Psychology

Abstract

WHEN philosophical conclusions are categorically expressed in the first person, it shows that their author is in earnest. Yet individual convictions, however strong, can scarcely pretend to carry universal assent. Philosophers, in particular, are hardened people: the very history of their subject compels them to be sceptical as to the decisive value of any particular system. To base a philosophical theory on the assertion that “psychology is the matrix of the sciences” is nothing new in itself. Scores of psychological schools are attempting the same thing from various angles; while in the more abstract domain of thought, the Russellian and the Brouwerian interpretations of mathematics and logic, in spite of their conflicting results, have shown some remarkable specimens of analysis of mental processes. The claims of Col. Lynch need therefore strong justification: the position of their author will be much clearer if he himself confronts his conclusions with those of other schools of thought. Otherwise an unassuming critic is bound to find in them some vague reminiscences of earlier readings. Brain and Mind. By Arthur Lynch. Pp. 36. (London: The Pioneer Press, 1931.) 6d.