Abstract
The security of wireless sensor networks (WSN) has become a great challenge due to the transmission of sensor data through an open and wireless network with limited resources. In the paper, we discussed a lightweight security scheme to protect the confidentiality of data transmission between sensors and an ally fusion center (AFC) over insecure links. For the typical security problem of WSN’s binary hypothesis testing of a target’s state, sensors were divided into flipping and non-flipping groups according to the outputs of a pseudo-random function which was held by sensors and the AFC. Then in order to prevent an enemy fusion center (EFC) from eavesdropping, the binary outputs from the flipping group were intentionally flipped to hinder the EFC’s data fusion. Accordingly, the AFC performed inverse flipping to recover the flipped data before data fusion. We extended the scheme to a more common scenario with multiple scales of sensor quantification and candidate states. The underlying idea was that the sensor measurements were randomly mapped to other quantification scales using a mapping matrix, which ensured that as long as the EFC was not aware of the matrix, it could not distract any useful information from the captured data, while the AFC could appropriately perform data fusion based on the inverse mapping of the sensor outputs.
Highlights
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are commonly deployed in various practical applications to gather information from a hostile area or placements where human intervention is impossible, and can support many new and important areas, such as customer satisfaction survey [1], unmanned aerial vehicles [2], military surveillance [3], and fire detection [4]
The security of WSN mainly involve decentralized detection whereby the sensors send their measurements to an ally fusion center (AFC) which attempts to detect the state of nature using the data received from all the sensors, an enemy fusion center (EFC), located in a vicinity of the AFC, tries to eavesdrop on the wireless communications between sensors and the AFC [7]
The data was supposed to be transmitted over open and insecure channels with the presence of an enemy fusion center EFC, which tried to gather all the transmitted data to form its own decision regarding the state of nature
Summary
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are commonly deployed in various practical applications to gather information from a hostile area or placements where human intervention is impossible, and can support many new and important areas, such as customer satisfaction survey [1], unmanned aerial vehicles [2], military surveillance [3], and fire detection [4]. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless network, sensor data are prone to be intercepted by unauthorized receivers [5,6]. The security of WSN mainly involve decentralized detection whereby the sensors send their measurements to an ally fusion center (AFC) which attempts to detect the state of nature using the data received from all the sensors, an enemy fusion center (EFC), located in a vicinity of the AFC, tries to eavesdrop on the wireless communications between sensors and the AFC [7]. To facilitate data encryption using symmetric cryptographic algorithms, the authors in [10,11] proposed novel lightweight anonymous authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols for WSN, which combines multi-security stages: User registration, sensor node registration, login, authentication, key agreement, and password change. The issue of scalability remains a great challenge, since a sensor’s life span is largely determined by its energy supply, which is difficult
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