Abstract

As a potential technology, the identity-based online/offline encryption scheme is split into two phases (the offline phase and the online phase) which is especially suitable for sensor nodes with limited computation resources in that most of the works can be executed offline. However, a challenging issue is the well-known identity-based online/offline encryption schemes unable to resist continual key leakage attacks of the secret keys. To address the above security challenge, we put forth the first continual leakage-resilient identity-based online/offline encryption scheme which is suitable for ensuring secure communications in wireless sensor networks. More specifically, our formal security proofs analysis indicates that the proposed scheme can guarantee security even if partial information of the secret key is continually leaked due to side-channel attacks or fault injection attacks. Above all, compared to the existing identity-based online/offline encryption schemes, an identity-based online/offline encryption scheme with continual leakage resilient meets wireless sensor networks with strong security.

Highlights

  • We summarize leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) cryptography and the online/offline encryption cryptography

  • We propose the first clr-identity-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE) scheme which is suitable for Wireless sensor networks (WSNs)

  • Sensor nodes in WSN with limited computation ability, but it brings some security challenges

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Summary

Related work

We summarize leakage-resilient IBE (lr-IBE) cryptography and the online/offline encryption cryptography. Li et al.[9] investigated how to accomplish chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) security of the lr-IBE scheme by applying a hash proof technique into Gentry’s IBE scheme.[3] the lr-IBE schemes presented in Alwen et al.,[7] Chow et al.,[8] and Li et al.[9] cannot resistant to continual key leakage attack. Another line of work is so-called the CLM. Our goal is to propose an IBOOE scheme in the continual key leakage security model

Motivation and our contribution
Procedure of decryption
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