Prospects for Evolutionary Policy

Abstract

Two well known and widely accepted arguments seem to show that evolutionary psychology is unlikely to tell us much of relevance to public policy. First, there is no good inference from the claim that X is an adaptation to the claim that X cannot be altered. So evolutionary psychology, even if it can establish that male philandering is adaptive, will not thereby tell us that male philandering is a trait that policy makers must work around rather than seek in vain to stamp out.' Second, the heuristic value of attempting to shed light on the makeup of the mind by reflection on the demands of ancestral environments is likely to be quite weak. Traits cannot be predicted from rough-grained facts about ancestral environments alone. So evolutionary psychology is also unlikely to give policy makers much of a leg-up in understanding how our minds work, even if it can explain why we have the kinds of minds we do.2 In spite of all this, a small number of biologists and philosophers continue to link the results of evolutionary psychology to matters of political concern. A few years ago, the UK policy think-tank Demos devoted its quarterly review to a series of short articles by journalists, philosophers and scientists on the input that evolutionary psychology might make to policy and economics.3 Peter Singer has urged a move towards a 'Darwinian Left' that refashions itself in response to our increasing understanding of human nature.4 Helena Cronin has written a number of pieces in collaboration with Oliver Curry arguing that the UK government's policy on the family would benefit from incorporating evolutionary psychologists Daly