Our computational nature: comment on Barrett et al.

John Klasios

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01348

Abstract

Our computational nature: comment on Barrett et al.

Highlights

I argue that Barrett et al (2014) have misinterpreted evolutionary psychologists’ notion of computation
Barrett et al seemingly presume that the notion of computation deployed by evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Pinker, 1997; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005) is tantamount to positing a physical architecture whose form of computation proceeds via the syntactic-like transformations of spatially discrete representational symbols or sentence-like structures—i.e., in the manner of a Turing machine
For evolutionary psychologists are primarily focused on the functional level of analysis of psychological adaptations rather than their physical instantiations

Summary

Introduction

From computers to cultivation: reconceptualizing evolutionary psychology by Barrett, L., Pollet, T. I argue that Barrett et al (2014) have misinterpreted evolutionary psychologists’ notion of computation. Barrett et al seemingly presume that the notion of computation deployed by evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Pinker, 1997; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005) is tantamount to positing a physical architecture whose form of computation proceeds via the syntactic-like transformations of spatially discrete representational symbols or sentence-like structures—i.e., in the manner of a Turing machine.

Results

Conclusion