Abstract
Abstract This paper introduces a new mechanism using tit-for-tat (TFT)-like strategy that successfully promotes cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game. The mechanism is based on a corollary of our previously presented kinship hypothesis : cooperation can emerge when players tend to cooperate with players that are similar but tend to defect to players that are dissimilar. A theoretical motivation for the new mechanism is presented as well as experimental results supporting the theory. The experimental results show that kinship biased conditional cooperation (KBCC) greatly improves the survival of cooperative individuals, eventually driving the population to cooperating equilibrium.
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