Abstract

AbstractAs the only source of jet pilot candidates for Turkish Air Force, Air Force Academy (TuAFA) applies several screening processes in order to acquire an average group of 150 cadets from civilian high school graduates each year. Besides the nationwide examinations (YGS-LYS), there are several others such as medical, flight, athletics evaluations and etc. Because the number of criteria for screening is large, the spread of the distribution of YGS-LYS scores of the candidates, which is assumed to be the aptitude towards college education, is a lot wider than those of other universities. Although admission to faculty for civilian high school students is regulated by the YGS-LYS score; in order to provide a balance distribution among different programs in terms of YGS-LYS score, placement to aerospace, electronics, computer and Industrial engineering programs of the Faculty is governed by a special directive. Although the directive considers candidates’ preferences, the ultimate goal of the algorithm in the directive is to keep the balance of academic success among different programs in the allocation process. In this study, we propose an alternative assignment model which tries to minimize the deviations from students’ preferences while maintaining the balance of the distribution among programs. Through simulation from different preference distributions with different number of students, it has been showed that regardless of the number of students and distribution of preferences,first choice allocation performance of the proposed model is significantly better than the directive’s algorithm.

Highlights

  • Graduation from a reputable university is assumed to be the key to succeed in life

  • In most of the developing countries, competition is fierce because the number of seats is disproportionally scarce against the population of students

  • In order to overcome the problem of uneven distribution of intellectual capital among different programs, Turkish Air Force Academy (TuAFA) follows a different placement strategy for its programs

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Graduation from a reputable university is assumed to be the key to succeed in life. On the other hand, in most of the developing countries, competition is fierce because the number of seats is disproportionally scarce against the population of students. In 2013, 38.2% of the students who passed the preelimination exam LGS and had the right to choose a program, did not attempt to do so, because they were sure that their combined score (40%LGS+60%LYS) would not allow them to get a seat in their order of preference. They kept their position instead of making a choice in vain. As an example in Turkey, after the announcement of combined YGS-LYS scores, students are allowed to choose 30 alternative programs to form their order of preference. X Some given element A of the first matched set prefers some given element B of the second matched set over the element to which A is already matched, and

TuAFA PROGRAM PLACEMENT ALGORITHM
PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT MODEL
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Proposed Method Disappointment Score
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