Abstract
This paper investigates the major weaknesses in essentialist art theories including a transformed new version known as the institutional theory. Proponents of the institutional theory like Danto and Dickie believe that the essence of art is a relational (rather than physical) property, with Dickie arguing that the two common characteristics are: (i) the work must be an artefact; and (ii) there must be someone or institution that confers on it the status of object for appreciation. I will show that such institutional theories may describe a necessary property, but never the sufficient property of art. This means that like traditional essentialist theories, they (also) fail to identify the essence of art. I will then argue in support of Morris Weitz's claim that art is an open concept, and its capacity for incorporating very novel and different objects or activities makes it impossible (and a waste of effort) to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions of art.
Highlights
This paper investigates the major weaknesses in essentialist art theories including a transformed new version known as the institutional theory
The question is with whom do I express solidarity? My paper expresses solidarity with Morris Weitz and his supporters, even though I pointed out earlier that Weitz has left himself open to criticism for not taking hidden or relational properties into account
My criticism of the institutional theory has reinforced my earlier claim that essentialist definitions are either too narrow, too broad, or both
Summary
Aesthetic theories have in the past attempted to define art by a description of its necessary and sufficient properties. A theory could describe a particular feature or characteristic found in works of art, and consider it as both the necessary and sufficient property of art (Collingwood's theory of expression, and Bell's theory of Significant Form, are good examples of this kind of theory). I admit to a certain degree that Wittgenstein may have chosen a better expression than "family resemblances" to describe these similarities in the activities we call games, because this phrase can be exploited by people like Mandelbaum to stress there is a common relational property (between members with family resemblances), i.e., biological ties. Some aestheticians in the 1960s developed the institutional theory of art—something is a work of art not because it has some directly observable property like Significant Form, but because it has some important relationship with society, or institutions in the society, which legitimises it as "art." I will focus on the institutional theory, and see whether it successfully identifies the essential property of art
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
