Problems and Possibilities for Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

The use of empirical work in philosophy of mind is an increasing trend and forms the starting point for this chapter. The potential value of such interdisciplinary research is not in question here, and it is assumed to be high. Rather, the chapter focuses on questions about the specific ways in which interdisciplinary research across philosophy and the mind/brain sciences is carried out. These include how empirical work can be used to support or revise existing philosophical positions, and the role of the empirically based philosopher in cognitive science. Following this, I suggest an alternative way of approaching questions in philosophy of mind and cognitive science in an interdisciplinary way, based on contemporary work in philosophy of science. This approach is explored through two examples, focusing on the interpretation of first-person data and questions about the boundaries of cognition. While not the only, or necessarily the best, approach to interdisciplinary work, I suggest that a focus on methodological questions from the point of view of philosophy of science is a potentially invaluable way of pursuing philosophical questions about the mind.