Problematyka podmiotowości prawnej zwierząt na przykładzie koncepcji utylitaryzmu Petera Singera

Abstract

The purpose of this article is the analysis of Peter Singer's concept of animal legal personality. Although it is an ethical idea, some doctrine representatives refer to it and prove that legal personality of animals is a necessity. Peter Singer's concept is based on the utilitarianism of preferences although it also refers to classical utilitarianism. His followers strongly criticize the current model of animal legal protection. It turns out, however, that the foundation of animal and human being protection is timeless and must be based on animals nature and a human being as a person. Whereas, the analysis of Peter Singer's concept leads to the conclusion that it is based on cognitive mistakes, concerning mostly human nature. In consequence, Peter Singer's concept of utilitarianism not only does not help better animal protection, but is also a threat to human rights protection.