Abstract
AbstractToll road competition is one of the important issues under a build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) scheme, which is being encountered nowadays in many cities. When there are two or more competing firms and each firm operates a competitive toll road, their profits are interrelated due to the competitors' choices and demand inter‐dependence in the network. In this paper we develop game‐theoretic approaches to the study of the road network, on which multiple toll roads are operated by competitive private firms. The strategic interactions and market equilibria among the private firms are analyzed both in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. The toll road competition problems in general traffic equilibrium networks are formulated as an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints or bi‐level variational inequalities. Heuristic solution methods are proposed and their convergences are demonstrated with simple network examples. It is shown that private pricing and competition can be both profitable and welfare‐improving.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
