Abstract

A common conclusion in present philosophy is that private languages are impossible. This conclusion derives from Wittgenstein and is usually thought to imply that a language which it would be impossible for more than one person to speak is not itself possible. Wittgenstein is not the only person to base an argument that private languages are impossible on the necessity of being able to distinguish between what is the case and what merely seems to be the case. This is also done by Shoemaker. Both Wittgenstein's and Shoemaker's arguments are criticized. It is clear that the main point of the private language argument is to show that a world just of sensations could not be a comprehensible world. Publicity and privacy are also outlined.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.