Abstract
This article argues that it is not obvious why the legal congruency of race and sex discrimination in employment ought to be accepted as an a priori principle. Although explicit sex classifications are presumptively invalid, they can be justified where there are strong efficiency interests at stake or where there is a broadly shared social norm that requires men and women be treated differently.
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