Abstract
Future Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) will require that vehicles are equipped with Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC). With these DSRC capabilities, new privacy threats are emerging that can be taken advantage of by threat actors with little experience and cheap components. However, the origins of these privacy threats are not limited to the vehicle and its communications, but extend to non-vehicular devices carried by the driver and passengers. A shortcoming of existing work is that it tends to focus on a specific aspect of privacy leakage when attempting to protect location privacy. In doing so, interactions between privacy threats are not considered. In this work, we investigate the privacy surface of a vehicle by considering the many different ways in which location privacy can be leaked. Following this, we identify techniques to protect privacy and that it is insufficient to provide location privacy against a single threat vector. A methodology to calculate the interactions of privacy preserving techniques is used to highlight the need to consider the wider threat landscape and for techniques to collaborate to ensure location privacy is provided against multiple sources of privacy threats where possible.
Highlights
C ONNECTED and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are expected to be widely deployed on road networks globally within the decade
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) allows vehicles to be tracked en masse, but it requires a deployment of ANPR cameras over a large area that is both expensive and noticeable
Individual vehicles can be tracked by threat actors with limited resources using location recording devices, but physical access is required for installation and they may be noticed by the driver
Summary
C ONNECTED and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are expected to be widely deployed on road networks globally within the decade. Transportation networks will deploy Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) to manage these vehicles. An issue with these systems is that they raise privacy concerns due to the ease in which they allow a vehicle to be tracked. Vehicle tracking has been of interest to threat actors trying to violate privacy for some time. In the recent past, violating location privacy has only been generally available to resource rich threat actors for mass surveillance or knowledgeable threat actors that focus on individual vehicles. Individual vehicles can be tracked by threat actors with limited resources using location recording devices, but physical access is required for installation and they may be noticed by the driver. New vehicular technologies provide methods of vehicle tracking that are cheaper, have fewer limitations, easier to deploy, and in some cases, harder to detect
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