Pride and Perseverance: Strategic Use of Rebus Sic Stantibus in Russian Foreign Policy 1870 – 1950

Abstract

The paper examines the use of rebus sic stantibus, a claim that a fundamental change of circumstances warrants withdrawal or termination of a treaty, by Russia in three key episodes in Russian foreign policy. These episodes have not been examined together by scholars and have not all been analysed from the perspective of rebus sic stantibus. First, it examines the situation in 1870 when Russia used this approach to obtain the London Declaration, which revised unfavourable terms in the 1856 Treaty of Paris following the Crimean War. Second, it examines the Soviet attempt to terminate or renegotiate the Montreux Convention during and in the aftermath of the Second World War through the use of rebus sic stantibus and, third, it examines the Soviet attempt to renegotiate the Svalbard Treaty through the use of this legal approach. Notably, the analysis shows that these attempts took place during shifts in Russia’s relative power. Given the design of the treaties in question, rebus sic stantibus was one of the only ways to achieve these goals. In addition to providing a thorough study of episodes unexamined from an international legal perspective, the paper may therefore shed light on when rebus sic stantibus is useful and why it is relied on less and less by states today.