Pricing strategy and coordination of small‐ to medium‐sized enterprises based on bank‐insurance cooperative financing

Abstract

With the increasingly serious environmental problems, the concept of environmental protection has been deeply rooted in people's minds. The development of small‐ to medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) is also highly concerned, but such technology‐led enterprises are still subject to more constraints in financing. This paper introduces the loan guarantee insurance, establishes the income model of each participant under the two financing modes of traditional accounts receivable financing and accounts receivable financing under the cooperation of bank and insurer, and explores the role of loan guarantee insurance in financing of SMEs based on the Stackelberg game model. If the manufacturer's default risk premium is high, at the same time, when the loan interest rate announced by the bank under bank‐insurance cooperation is lower than the traditional model, the manufacturer under the loan guarantee insurance model produces and sells more products. However, while guaranteeing their own profits, the bank and insurer can lower the loan interest rate and insurance premium rate as far as possible, which can stimulate the market. By analyzing the complexity of the system, it is found that the decision‐maker's choice of adjusting speed and initial value affects the development state of the system.