Pricing, environmental governance efficiency, and channel coordination in a socially responsible tourism supply chain

Abstract

AbstractWe investigate the pricing and environmental governance efficiency decisions and channel coordination of a dyadic tourism supply chain with corporate social responsibility. We consider two cases: only the theme park exhibits (environmental) social responsibility; and both theme park and tour operator exhibit social responsibility. For each case, we design a coordination mechanism. In the first case, we find that (a) if the environmental governance investment is relatively inexpensive, then the retail price, environmental governance efficiency, and sale quantity may simultaneously increase with the theme park's environmental responsibility (extra investment on the treatment of ungoverned environmental damage) under the centralized system; (b) it is more likely to achieve a win‐win outcome if the theme park cares more about the environment when the channel is coordinated; (c) the theme park's environmental responsibility enables itself to gain more coordination benefit when its negotiation power is relatively high. In the second case, we find that (a) the environmental governance efficiency or sale quantity increases with the tour operator's social responsibility; (b) both members’ profits may increase with the tour operator's social responsibility.