Pricing Decision and Cancellation Strategy Selection of ''Hotel+Online Platform''

Abstract

Based on the consumer's cancellation behavior, a “Hotel + online platform” dual-channel supply chain model consisting of a single hotel and a single online platform is constructed, based on the theory of consumer utility, this paper constructs the demand for rooms in the supply chain, and analyzes the profit of the hotel side, room pricing and cancellation strategy under the competition-cooperation relationship by using the Stackelberg game model. The research shows that in the hotel's dual-channel supply chain, the selection of unsubscribing strategy for official direct sales channels and online agency platforms and the pricing of rooms are affected by the probability of unsubscribe, the cost of unsubscribing, consumers' preference level for online platforms and commission rates; when both direct sales channels and online platforms adopt non-unsubscribe strategies, the profits and pricing of both parties are independent of the cost of unsubscribing. When the hotel direct sales channel adopts the unsubscribed strategy, then the room price increases with the increase of the cost of unsubscribing; at the same time, when the online platform chooses the unsubscribed strategy, the preferential amount is decreases with the increase of the cost of unsubscribing; on the contrary, it increases with the increase of the cost of unsubscribing. When consumers have a high preference level on the online platform, the strategy is the optimal strategy.