PREVENTING MISUSE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES

Abstract

The scope of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is sufficiently broad to deal with new threats emerging from developments in the life sciences; however, more thought still needs to be given to updating and improving measures to encourage biodefense-related information sharing and transparency between states. Biodefense is and has been at the core of the BWC, but the threat of bioterrorism should not distract BWC state parties or cause them to disregard the risk that illicit state-run bioweapons programs will utilize new advances in the life sciences. More states are pursuing biodefense programs—and spending more on such programs. The BWC community must address the issue of how states and civil society observers can determine the point at which a biodefense program, or parts of it, could be secretly transformed into an offensive bioweapons program. The authors propose several measures for increasing the transparency of biodefense programs, including: national oversight, confidence-building measures, mandatory codes of practice, confidence-building visits, and an international mechanism to encourage and protect whistleblowers. The authors conclude that unless accountability and transparency in biodefense programs can be attained within the next five years, the BWC will lose its relevance.