Abstract
ABSTRACT Conversational contextualists claim that the truth-conditions of knowledge claims depend upon the dynamics of the conversation in which the knowledge claim is made. However, they have failed to appreciate the ways in which conversational dynamics are influenced by unjust distributions of power. What would the implications be for conversational contextualism if its proponents were not guilty of this oversight? I ask this question for Blome-Tillmann’s presuppositional epistemic contextualism (PEC), perhaps the most sophisticated form of conversational contextualism. The investigation turns up a host of counterintuitive implications of PEC that count against it. I suggest placing moral constraints on conversational dynamics as a way of revising PEC in order to avoid the identified counterintuitive implications.
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