Presumptive arguments turned into a fallacy of presumptuousness: Pre-election debates in a democracy of promises

Abstract

This paper deals with pre-election discourse in Hungary identifying complex argumentative moves that call for modifications in traditional research methodologies. Based on theoretical studies and real-life public debates a fine-grained analysis is offered to discern substantive arguments from presumptive arguments. The assessment of politicians’ argumentative practices takes into account both the critical-rationalist and the pragma-dialectical perspectives on reasoned discussion. The results show that presumptions function as special kinds of inferences grounded in considerations related to the context or circumstances in which the inferences are to be drawn. Presumptive reasoning is shown to be a paradigm case of rational activity in assessing the expectations of others. In the analysis of political discourse the aim is to find out what beliefs electors entertain and how their positions on certain issues get influenced by politicians’ arguments. Thus, the paper offers a new look at the notion of rational discussion. The early bed-rock certainty of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation as a prime example of normative pragmatics seems to be losing its primacy: at best we can try to adhere to a mixture of a critical-rationalistic view of reasonableness and the dialectical notion of reasonableness in real-life debates and public argumentations.