Presidential “Pitches” and White House Pressure: Interpersonal Presidential Persuasion in a Shared Lawmaking Environment

Abstract

AbstractBargaining is a critical component to exercising shared lawmaking powers. Conventional wisdom holds that presidents are effective at personally persuading members of Congress to support favored legislation, but recent scholarship shows when and how they get involved matters. Yet, we know less about specifically how presidents bargain with members of Congress and which types of interpersonal presidential communication frames persuade members of Congress. Using unique data from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library concerning the White House’s press for passage of the 1983 budget, this article addresses how presidents position their legislative pitches and to which members. While ideology matters most in predicting members supporting the White House’s preferred legislation, we find a “compromise” pitch from the White House works better for bipartisan‐tagged legislation than appeals to “party unity.” These findings provide a unique window into informal bargaining arrangements and allow us to understand how presidents influence members of Congress.