Presidential extraversion: Understanding the politics of Sino-African mega-infrastructure projects

Abstract

The past two decades have witnessed increasing scholarly analysis of China’s growing presence in Africa. How does African agency operate within the asymmetric power relations between China and African states? How do African actors use foreign-sponsored projects to achieve domestic objectives? Some analyses take a China-centered perspective, with divergent views about how Chinese economic engagement promotes or inhibits African development. Scholarly work increasingly recognizes the agency of African actors. I advance upon the African agency argument by proposing a concept of presidential extraversion. I argue that Chinese-sponsored projects in Africa have coincided with the host ruler’s strategies for political survival. Internationally, African rulers have strategized among their available options to ensure that the state received foreign finance and services on the most favorable terms. Domestically, they have instrumentalized Chinese-sponsored projects and loans to demonstrate their performance legitimacy and sustain patronage networks. I process-trace the Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway and Angolan Kilamba Kiaxi housing project, primarily relying on evidence collected in Kenya, Angola, and China from 2017 to 2019. The findings challenge the neo-dependency argument and show that despite Sino-African power asymmetry, African leaders have had the agency to shape this relationship to their advantage. The presidential extraversion argument advances upon African extraversion theory by locating the agency within the African political leaders rather than elites broadly.