Abstract

The nine men who assembled in the office of Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal on a Thursday afternoon in September 1947 were there for a rehearsal. The following day they would join President Harry S. Truman for the very first meeting of the National Security Council (NSC). Although the purpose of the NSC had been spelled out the previous July in the National Security Act, the relationship of this unique advisory body to the president, the military establishment, and the State Department remained unclear. Thus those in Forrestal's office had a keen sense that the precedents they set would be crucial to its success or failure. Because it was important, for example, that the NSC discuss matters of substance, Forrestal and Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett had agreed that the situation in Italy would be the first issue on the agenda. As the secretary of defense, his military advisers, and the civilian secretaries of the army, navy, and air force listened, Lovett discussed the situation in Italy something of a dry run. 1 Forrestal, more than any other individual, was responsible for the creation of the NSC. Yet even as he prepared for its first meeting, at work were other forces that would irrevocably influence the character of the NSC and its relation to United States foreign policy. There is agreement among students of foreign policy that even though the NSC first met in September 1947, President Truman did not use the NSC until the outbreak of war in Korea. Truman rarely attended NSC meetings, and he made important policy decisions with the help of only a few trusted advisers.2

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