Abstract

BackgroundThis contribution seeks to measure preferences for health insurance in Germany and the Netherlands, using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE). Since the Dutch DCE was carried out right after the 2006 health reform, which made citizens explicitly choose a health insurance contract, two research questions naturally arise. First, are the preferences with regard to contract attributes (such as Managed Care-type restrictions of physician choice), incentives (such as bonus options for no claims, deductibles, and a bonus for preventive behavior), and extra services provided by the health insurer (such as patient counseling) similar between the two countries? Second, was the requirement to explicitly choose imposed by the Dutch government in the context of the reform effective in reducing status quo bias with respect to future reforms?ResultsBased on random-effects Probit estimates, these two questions can be answered as follows. First, there is resistance against Managed Care-type attributes in both populations, but Germans would have to be compensated more for giving up free physician choice. Second, their status quo bias is twice as important as among their Dutch counterparts, who apparently learned to bear the cost of information associated with future choices concerning their health insurance.JEL codesC25, D12, I18

Highlights

  • This contribution seeks to measure preferences for health insurance in Germany and the Netherlands, using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE)

  • Respondents participating in a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) are supposed to maximize utility

  • The comparison is based on two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) performed in Germany and in the Netherlands right after the 2006 reform, which made citizens explicitly choose their health insurance

Read more

Summary

Introduction

This contribution seeks to measure preferences for health insurance in Germany and the Netherlands, using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE). Governments in industrial countries have been trying to respond to the rising cost of health care by modifying health insurance (copayments, bonus options for new claims) or changing the provision of health care (Managed Care). It is far from clear whether citizens are ready to accept these changes. In insurance-based systems, observed past choices provide little guidance because they are distorted by regulated contributions to health insurance, while in National Health Service-type systems, medical care has a tax price that is the same at a given income level In this situation, experimental evidence concerning citizens’ preferences may be of value to avoid costly mistakes by health insurers and policy makers. This paper seeks to answer two questions: Q1: Are preferences of German and Dutch consumers similar or dissimilar with regard to attributes of health insurance?

Methods
Results
Discussion
Conclusion
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.