Abstract

AbstractChapter 5 starts with an assessment of how the preference configuration in coalition governments influences the content of coalition agreements. It is argued that ideological conflict in coalition cabinets positively affects issue attention as coalition parties have stronger incentives to negotiate a detailed policy agenda that constrains their coalition partners when intra-cabinet conflict is high. However, it is posited that this effect is conditioned by preference tangentiality and the overall salience of policy issues among cabinet partners as the incentives to engage in lengthy negotiations about a policy compromise increase with the salience of an issue but decrease as tangentiality rises. The results presented in this chapter support this argument.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.