Preface

Abstract

Extract Coalition agreements are a fundamental aspect of democratic governance. Before taking over executive offices, political parties negotiate for weeks or months behind closed doors. Negotiating such an agreement not only takes time and resources, but compromises have to be made which may result in intra-party conflicts and electoral costs. Why do coalition parties spend so much time and resources on negotiating coalition agreements even though they are not even legally binding? In this book, we argue that coalition agreements use coalition agreements as control devices, but that their use importantly varies with the preference configuration and the allocation of ministerial portfolios across policy areas. We test our argument based on the newly compiled COALITIONAGREE Dataset, which is based on a systematic collection and content analysis of 229 coalition agreements that have been negotiated by 189 parties between 1945 and 2015 in 24 West and East European countries. This newly compiled COALITIONAGREE Dataset will be made publicly available with this book and opens up entirely new ways to study coalition governments that will be of interest to numerous scholars of coalition cabinets, party competition, legislative politics and political representation. This book is an essential resource for anyone interested in understanding the complex dynamics of coalition politics and the role of coalition agreements in shaping the functioning of democratic governments.