Abstract
This paper argues that proper names may have literal non-referential truth-conditional values, thereby undermining the notion of semantic reference.
Highlights
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the mainstream view that natural language proper names are referring expressions
This paper argued that proper names may have truth-conditional values other than individuals; they may have sets or properties as values
The argument may be summarized as follows: (a) The mainstream view holds that all proper names are referential; (b) but there exist non-referential proper names; (c) it is false that all proper names are referential; some are predicative
Summary
Resumo: Este trabalho argumenta que os nomes próprios podem ter valoreis vericondicionais não referenciais, mesmo quando eles são usados e interpretados literalmente, minando assim a noção de referência semântica. Palavras-chave: Referência, nomes próprios, distinção referencial/atributivo; Abstract: This paper argues that proper names may have literal non-referential truth-conditional values, thereby undermining the notion of semantic reference.
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