Pragmatism as the foundation of cognitive enactivism

Abstract

The current prevailing embodied cognitive science is essentially the result of the pragmatic turn of cognitive science, and enactivism is the epitome of this turn. For a long time, most advocates of enactivism have consciously regarded phenomenology as their important source of thought but ignored its pragmatic roots. In fact, there are many similarities between enactivism and pragmatism, and pragmatism has foreshadowed some core ideas and principles of enactivism. In particular, enactivism contains a pragmatic assumption that there is interaction between organisms and their environment, and cognitive ability is evolved and developed by organisms in the history of interactions with their environment. Their interpretations of cognition both rely on the theoretical support of biology and emphasize the basic role of organisms’ active capacities and environment in the formation of cognition. They hold a neutral monism position ontologically. Undoubtedly, pragmatism is the precursor of cognitive enactivism. Pragmatism not only provides rich conceptual resources for the development of enactivism, but also provides a unique perspective and method to solve some problems in its theory. Pragmatism is a rich mine for enactivists to further explore.