Pragmatism and Pluralism

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1. Talisse and Aikin argue that pragmatists who take themselves to be pluralists are making a serious mistake. The pluralism in question here is 'deep' pluralism: the view that the persistence of disagreement or conflict is not due to a mistake on someone's part or to human frailty, but is due to the world. I think that Tallise and Aikin are on to something important here. Those pragmatists who take themselves to be pluralists (James, Dewey, Rorty, for instance)1 do indeed turn their backs on something essential to pragmatism. I shall, that is, agree with Talisse and Aiken that pragmatism and a principled, across-the-board pluralism are in tension. Pragmatists cannot be pluralists who enthusiastically hold that the world makes pluralism inevitable. They ought to follow the founder of the doctrine C.S. Peirce in being unenthusiastic about pluralism. Nonetheless and here I part company with Talisse and Aikin pragmatists also ought to follow Peirce in reconciling themselves to the possibility of pluralism's holding here and there. We shall see that, despite this reluctant attitude towards pluralism, the pragmatist can and must celebrate and encourage the diversity of views. 2. The lever on which the pragmatist's position on pluralism turns is the concept of truth. It is unsurprising that James, Dewey, and Rorty take themselves to be pluralists, as they are constantly tempted by the view that there is no truth only different, equally warranted, accounts of what is the case. Peirce was much more of an objectivist about truth and so it is also unsurprising that he is less keen on pluralism. Peirce argued that a true belief is one which would be indefeasible or one which would stand up to the rigors of inquiry (CP 5.569, 6.485). A true belief is one which is unassailable by doubt; it is a belief which would meet every demand we were to place on it (CP 5.416). On this view, truth is a stable property a belief is either true (indefeasible) or not. And truth is not a matter for some particular community if a belief is indefeasible, it would stand up to whatever could be thrown at it, by any community of inquirers. 3. Talisse and Aikin distinguish between meaning pragmatism and inquiry pragmatism. Meaning pragmatism, they say, is roughly: the meaning of a concept lies in its practical consequences. Conflict or disagreement is to be dissolved, not resolved, as it is often a problem about clarifying meaning. Inquiry pragmatism,