Power politics in the New South Africa

Abstract

A consensus on South Africa's transition from apartheid is crystallising. According to it, the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP), which initially opened negotiations reluctantly and suspiciously, were subsequently transformed by the experience. They are said to have developed mutual trust, discounted questions of political power, and agreed to a constitution allowing the new democratic government — predictably headed by the ANC — to commence instituting its political programme. This piece takes exception to this on several scores. It maintains that considerations of power, which vanish from the conventional story, were central to the eventual settlement, and stresses two significant constraints on South Africa's new democracy. The government, as was anticipated by the NP, is exposed to relentless pressure to adopt policies preferred by capital, which exerts steady conservative influence on the ANC. Moreover, the terms negotiated in the interim constitution specifically protect the integrity of established bureaucracies, doubly constraining the democratic government. Conservative state interests fortify conservative economic interests, offsetting the social and economic radicalism of the ANC. The thesis presented here is that the political bargain in South Africa provides significant protections for interests associated with the NP and blunts the powers of the ANC. As a result, the ANC is struggling to satisfy promises of social transformation and is tempted to shift its political base from popular organisations to state bureaucracies. Thus, South Africa's political bargain is democratic in form, but is incipiently statist and conservative in substance.