Abstract

ABSTRACT This letter investigates the impact of the shift in antitrust treatment of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) in the US beer industry, transitioning from a categorical illegality (per se illegal) to a case-by-case evaluation (rule of reason) post-Leegin. Our objective is to analyse the effects of this change on beer prices. We find a significant increase in beer prices in states permitting RPM after Leegin. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on RPM agreements by highlighting potential welfare implications associated with the shift in antitrust treatment.

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