Abstract

This article addresses post‐Cold War requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, including requirements for both major‐power deterrence and regional deterrence. The report first examines the background and context for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, as it developed during the U.S.‐Soviet competition from 1945 through 1991. It then examines the new context for deterrence and stresses the multiple audiences and circumstances to which the United States may seek to apply deterrent policies over the coming decades. The next section explores the current U.S. approach to deterrence, based on an assessment of official statements and policy decisions since the end of the Cold War. This leads to a consideration of emerging requirements for U.S. deterrence policy, with particular emphasis on those political, military‐strategic, and nuclear elements of deterrence that current policy may not adequately address.

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