Nuclear Deterrence and Self-Defense

Abstract

It has been said that, in discussions of nuclear arms, consequences overwhelm principles, that considerations of ten or twenty or forty million human dead overwhelm those of abstract rights and principles. Hence, most discussions of the morality of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy have focused on the issue of whether deterrence does in fact deter. That is, they focus on whether deterrence discourages the awesome consequences of nuclear war.' But what if it could be shown that nuclear deterrence is a moral failure apart from the sheer number of casualties resulting from a nuclear war? In this article I show that the structure of the moral argument for nuclear deterrence is flawed owing to straightforward considerations of the principle of self-defense. I analyze the concept of a right to self-defense by isolating a set of limiting conditions on its exercise; I then map individual analogues to a policy of national nuclear deterrence to show that deterrence fails to meet these conditions. Because the position I defend regards nuclear deterrence as morally unacceptable, it does not tolerate nuclear threats even when considered as an interim solution along the road to disarmament. I want to define nuclear deterrence as a policy implemented for the purpose of avoiding enemy attack involving the maintenance of a strategic