Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that the differences between Gettier-era epistemology and post-Gettier epistemology can be largely traced to differences in methodology. We will give a “rational reconstruction” of how we did things then, what we do now, and what considerations moved us to do things differently. In summary form, during the Gettier era the methodology of epistemology was roughly what Chisholm called “particularism” and Rawls called “the method of reflective equilibrium.” Various developments forced an abandonment of this Gettier era methodology, in favor of several new constraints on an adequate theory of knowledge. Questions about the nature of epistemic normativity, the relations between knowledge and action, the value of knowledge, and the social dimensions of knowledge, all became important for adjudicating among competing theories of knowledge. This was appropriate in that the older methodology was inadequate. The new methodology accounts for the increased richness and depth that we see in epistemology today.
Highlights
In this paper, it is argued that the differences between Gettier-era epistemology and post-Gettier epistemology can be largely traced to differences in methodology
How so? And how did we get here? I want to argue that the differences between Gettier-era epistemology and post-Gettier epistemology can be largely traced to differences in methodology
Various developments forced an abandonment of this Gettier era methodology, in favor of several new constraints on an adequate theory of knowledge
Summary
Long before Gettier’s 1963 paper, philosophers wanted an account of knowledge. This would be, ideally, a set of reasonably elegant, necessary, sufficient and informative conditions. The broader project was to gain philosophical insight into what knowledge is, or how we employ the concept, or how we use the word, and it was thought that the way to do this was to provide necessary, sufficient and informative conditions. When Gettier’s paper was published in 1963, there was at that time a rough consensus that knowledge is justified true belief. As I suggested early, epistemology’s character today, as well as its current state of flourishing, can be largely explained by a shift in methodology that defines our post-Gettier era. Before getting to the new methodology, it is important to understand Gettier-era methodology
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