Abstract
This chapter considers the weight of populist arguments in the season of constitutional reform in Italy since the early 1990s. The understanding of populism is based on a dualistic perspective, in which democracies are subject to a fundamental tension between constitutionalism and populism. Two failed reform projects—respectively undertaken by the Berlusconi government in 2004–06 and the Renzi government in 2014–16—are considered in light of three typical aspects of the interplay of populism and public law: majoritarianism, instrumentalism, and legal resentment. Those attempts at constitutional reform were unsuccessful; however, a populist attitude seems to have become the prevalent flavour in Italian constitutional politics debates.
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