Popular Response to China's Fertility Transition

Abstract

Data from a number of surveys conducted in recent years in China are reviewed in an effort to gain some insight into popular responses to the countrys 1-child program. As much of the available data from these recent surveys as possible is presented to provide descriptive information on Chinas family planning program. Indicators of actual trends in Chinas fertility since 1970 are examined followed by data that deal with the preferred family size of various segments of the Chinese population. It is assumed that such data provide at least rough if conservative indicators of the number of cildren people want to have. The emphasis remains at the level of description and simple analysis. Table 1 presents figures on the total fertility rate in China for selected years since 1950 as calculated from the 1982 one-in-one-thousand national fertility survey. In 1970 the total fertility rate (5.8) was actually higher than the 1950 figure (5.6). Over the next decade a more than 60% drop in the total fertility rate occurred and in spite of recent fluctuations low levels of fertility have been maintained. In the 1980s Chinas birthrate figures resemble those from developed countries much more than those from low-income countries. In the West this marked change in fertility behavior has sometimes been interpreted as a result of the 1-child campaign yet it is clear that a substantial reduction in fertility preceded the introduction of the 1-child policy and that the policy was more an effort to prevent the birthrate from rebounding upward. In the 1980s there has been considerably less than full compliance with the official 1-child policy although the percentage of 1st order births was quite high in comparative terms. This lack of full compliance reflects in part the fact that although family size preferences have decreased few people would prefer to have only 1 child. 2 children would be acceptable to most people in both rural and urban areas but preferably these should be a boy and a girl. If underlying family size preferences were the only influence on fertility behavior one can assume that considerably more women than are currently doing so would have 2 or more children. Efforts to change these underlying preferences include convincing families that their interests can be best served by having small numbers of children and particularly by having 1 child. A central element of this strategy is to raise popular aspirations for social mobility education consumption and leisure. It seems that the Chinese authorities have realized some success in this direction.