Političke i bezbjednosne dimenzije u rješavanju Kosovsko-Sjevernomakedonske demarkacije granice

Abstract

Drawing borders in post-conflict situations is a challenging undertaking between two or more actors that often ends up in arbitration. In some cases, it produces a political confrontation that may turn into a cycle of violence. This article sheds light on the dynamics of political and security challenges, the interaction of the foreign actors and the role of the local government and civic activism in resolving disputes related to the Kosovo-Macedonia border. This article focuses on the obstacles that came from the non-definition of the status of Kosovo and the popular and institutional dissatisfaction regarding the agreement on the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), bypassing Kosovo and UNMIK from decisionmaking. Secondly, it asks whether these two sovereign countries have had the right to decide on the part of the border that separates Kosovo and Macedonia and was it an appropriate moment to reach an agreement on the border in tense situation between Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia? If so, why was Kosovo not included in the final stage of implementation of the agreement? Third, in unclear situation with Kosovo political status, which of the parties to the agreement would be able undertake practical ground activity, that of placing the border stones and which kind of writings will take place on them: „Serbia” and „Macedonia”, or „Kosovo” and „Macedonia”? Could the implementation of the agreement be postponed, at least for the part that divided Kosovo and Macedonia, and completed instead after the final status of Kosovo was determined? We argue that political momentum between Kosovo-Macedonia-Serbia triangle did not favor achieve such sensitive agreement between newly created states of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and FYROM. Excluding Kosovo provisional institutions and UN civil administration from the border agreement was a mistake that produced instability, hostility and additional bitterness in interethnic relations at the early stages, followed by the status quo. And, finally, including Kosovo as a partner in implementing the border issue paved the way for interstate cooperation that led to Macedonia’s recognition of Kosovo, which erupt a short wave of anti-Macedonian rhetoric by both, Serbian political leadership and people protests. The evidence used for the arguments presented were positivists qualitative methods such as social survey and official statistics. The principle of uti possidetis was applied on the border disputes in the period after the breakup of Yugoslavia, and also in the case of the demarcation of the border between Kosovo and the states of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, as the best solution because it lies in „its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved”. In drawing conclusions related to the article topic, I used a combined methodology of literature research, comparative analyses and positivist qualitative methods such as social surveys through structured questionnaires, official statistics, interviewing the bearers of the institutions of the time and members of the technical commission for border demarcation. Archive of Kosovo Parliament and personal files also became important sources.