Politics and the Media: A Crisis of Trust?

Abstract

2003 seemed to confrm the suspicions of a public already dubious about government communication. Despite the intense public relations offensive before the Iraq war in March, the public were sceptical of Iraq’s threat, and the revelations of the Hutton Inquiry showed they had every right to be. The Inquiry, one of the key events of the year, raised serious doubts about the accuracy of many of the government’s claims on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The media’s credibility did not fare much better. Although the news media provided a window on the world of politics, the content which the public received was subject to widespread criticism. The press, especially certain tabloid newspapers, was seen as largely out of touch with its readers in the lead up to the war. The Hutton Inquiry raised a series of questions about the accuracy of BBC news output. 24-hour news coverage of the Iraq war, although live, showed the extent to which there was tension between speed and accuracy in the ratings-driven news environment. This article examines the tactics employed by Downing Street to persuade the public of the need for war. Using evidence from opinion polls, it assesses the public response to those efforts. It looks at the coverage of the ‘war on Saddam’ by the British media, the military and government newsmanagement operation, and the public’s viewing habits. It looks at the postwar feud between Downing Street and the BBC over broadcast claims that Downing Street had ‘sexed-up’ an intelligence dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction to win public support for armed intervention. It looks at the subsequent inquiry by Lord Hutton into the suicide of civil servant David Kelly and its impact on the Prime Minister and the Downing Street media operation. It asks whether the events of this year have served to further undermine the already fragile trust in government communication. The propaganda battle January saw a continuation of the Prime Minister’s and his government’s public relations offensive to try to persuade a largely sceptical public of the need to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction by force, rather than give the UN inspectors more time to fnd them. A key element in this campaign was intelligence information used by Downing Street to reinforce its argument that Saddam’s weapons were a ‘clear and present danger’. In February, Downing Street posted a second