Abstract
Abstract Nuclear deterrence strategies are predicated on nuclear use scenarios. However, as nuclear weapons haven’t been used since 1945, why does use occur in scenarios but not in practice? If scenarios incorporated the political challenges of crossing the nuclear threshold, how would this change the utility of the deterrence strategies they support? To address these questions, this article examines Cold War-era American debates about a Soviet ‘first strike’, discusses the limits of technical critiques of nuclear use scenarios, and argues for an alternative approach to scenario design and criticism that includes political factors observable in crises and wars involving nuclear states.
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